Abstract. Due to its universality oblivious transfer (OT) is a primitive of great importance in secure multi-party computation. OT is impossible to implement from scratch in an unconditionally secure way, but there are many reductions of OT to other variants of OT, as well as other primitives such as noisy channels. It is important to know how efficient such unconditionally secure reductions can be in principle, i.e., how many instances of a given primitive are at least needed to implement OT. For perfect (error-free) implementations good lower bounds are known, e.g. the bounds by Beaver (STOC '96) or by Dodis and Micali (EUROCRYPT '99). However, in practice one is usually willing to tolerate a small probability of error and it is known that these statistical reductions can in general be much more efficient. Thus, the known bounds have only limited application. In the first part of this work we provide bounds on the efficiency of secure (one-sided) two-party computation of arbitrary finite functions from distributed randomness in the statistical case. From these results we derive bounds on the efficiency of protocols that use (different variants of) OT as a black-box. When applied to implementations of OT, our bounds generalize known results to the statistical case. Our results hold in particular for transformations between a finite number of primitives and for any error. Furthermore, we provide bounds on the efficiency of protocols implementing Rabin OT. In the second part we study the efficiency of quantum protocols implementing OT. Recently, Salvail, Schaffner and Sotakova (ASIACRYPT '09) showed that most classical lower bounds for perfectly secure reductions of OT to distributed randomness still hold in a quantum setting. We present a statistically secure protocol that violates these bounds by an arbitrarily large factor. We then present a weaker lower bound that does hold in the statistical quantum setting. We use this bound to show that even quantum protocols cannot extend OT. Finally, we present two lower bounds for reductions of OT to commitments and a protocol based on string commitments that is optimal with respect to both of these bounds.
Introduction
Secure multi-party computation allows two or more distrustful players to jointly compute a function of their inputs in a secure way ([60] ). Security here means that the players compute the value of the function correctly without learning more than what they can derive from their own input and output.
A primitive of central importance in secure multi-party computation is oblivious transfer (OT), as it is sufficient to execute any multi-party computation securely [33, 37] . The original form of OT (( 1 2 )-RabinOT 1 ) has been introduced by Rabin in [47] . It allows a sender to send a bit x, which the receiver will get with probability 1 2 . Another variant of OT, called one-out-of-two bit-OT ( 2 1 -OT 1 ) was defined in [28] (see also [52] ). Here, the sender has two input bits x 0 and x 1 . The receiver gives as input a choice bit c and receives x c without learning x 1−c . The sender gets no information about the choice bit c. Other important variants of OT are n t -OT k where the inputs are strings of k bits and the receiver can choose t < n out of n secrets and (p)-RabinOT k where the inputs are strings of k bits and the erasure probability is p ∈ [0, 1].
If the players have access to noiseless (classical or quantum) communication only, it is impossible to implement unconditionally secure OT, i.e. secure against an adversary with unlimited computing power. It has been shown in [18] [7, 20, 12, 11] , and n 1 -OT k can be implemented from 2 1 -OT k ′ [10, 12, 26, 56] . There has also been a lot of interest in reductions of OT to weaker primitives. It is known that OT can be realized from noisy channels [17, 19, 23, 59 ], noisy correlations [54, 44] , or weak variants of OT [17, 13, 25, 11, 24, 58] .
In the quantum world, it has been shown in [8, 61, 22, 51] that OT can be implemented from black-box commitments, something that is impossible in the classical setting.
Given these positive results it is natural to ask how efficient such reductions can be in principle, i.e., how many instances of a given primitive are needed to implement OT.
Previous Results
In the classical setting, several lower bounds for OT reductions are known. The first impossibility result for unconditionally secure reductions of OT has been presented in [4] . There it has been shown that the number of 
-OT
1 cannot be extended 3 , i.e., there does not exist a protocol using n instances of 2 1 -OT 1 that perfectly implements m > n instances. Lower bounds for the number of instances of OT needed to perfectly implement other variants of OT have been presented in [26] (see also [42] ) and generalized in [56, 55] . These bounds apply to both the semi-honest (where dishonest players follow the protocol) and the malicious (where dishonest players behave arbitrarily) model. If we restrict ourselves to the malicious model these bounds can be improved, as shown in [38] . Lower bounds on the number of ANDs needed to implement general functions have been presented in [6] .
All these results only consider perfect protocols and do not give much insight into the case of statistical implementations. As pointed out in [38] , their result only applies to the perfect case, because there is a statistical protocol that is more efficient ( [21] ). The bounds for perfect and statistical protocols can in fact be very far apart, as shown in [6] : The amount of OTs needed to compute the equality function is exponentially bigger in the perfect case than in the statistical case. Therefore, it is not true in general that a bound in the perfect case implies a similar bound in the statistical case.
So far very little is known in the statistical case. In [1] a proof sketch of a lower bound for statistical implementations of 2 1 -OT k has been presented. However, this result only holds in the asymptotic case, where the number n of resource primitives goes to infinity and the error goes to zero as n goes to infinity. In [6] a non-asymptotic lower bound on the number of ANDs needed for one-sided secure computation of arbitrary functions with boolean output has been shown. This result directly implies lower bounds for protocols that use n t -OT k as a black-box. However, besides being restricted to boolean-valued functions this result is not strong enough to show optimality of several known reductions and it does not provide bounds for reductions to randomized primitives such as ( In the quantum setting almost all negative results known show that a certain primitive is impossible to implement from scratch. Commitment has been shown to be impossible in the quantum setting in [43, 41] . Using a similar proof, it has been shown in [40] that general one-sided two-party computation and in particular oblivious transfer are also impossible to implement securely in the quantum setting.
To our knowledge, the only lower bounds for quantum protocols where the players have access to resource primitives (such as different variants of OT) have been presented in [48] where Theorem 4.7 shows that important lower bounds for classical protocols also apply to perfectly secure quantum reductions.
Contribution
Classical Reductions. In Section 2 we consider statistically secure protocols in the semi-honest model that compute a function between two parties from trusted randomness distributed to the players. We provide two bounds on the efficiency of such reductions that allow in particular to derive bounds on the minimal number of n t -OT k or (p)-RabinOT k needed to compute any given function securely. Our bounds do not involve any asymptotics, i.e., we consider a finite number of resource primitives and our results hold for any error.
In Section 2.5 we provide an additional bound for the special case of statistical implementations of 
Corollary 1 generalizes the lower bounds from [26, 56, 55 ] to the statistical case and is strictly stronger than the impossibility bounds from [1] . If we let M = m + 1, N = n = 2 and K = k = 1, we obtain a stronger version of Theorem 3 from [4] which states that OT cannot be extended.
In Appendix B, we also derive new bounds in the statistical case for protocols implementing (p)-RabinOT k , and show that our bounds imply bounds for implementations of oblivious linear function evaluation (OLFE).
Our lower bounds show that the following protocols are (close to) optimal in the sense that they use the minimal number of instances of the given primitive.
-The protocol in [12, 26] which uses
-The protocol in [56] which uses t instances of
-In the semi-honest model, the trivial protocol that implements
is optimal. In the malicious case, the protocol in [21] uses asymptotically (as k goes to infinity) the same amount of instances and is therefore asymptotically optimal. -The protocol in [49] that implements Quantum Reductions. While previous result show that quantum protocols show similar limits as classical protocols for reductions between different variants of oblivious transfer, we present in Section 3.1 a statistically secure protocol that violates the classical bounds and the bound for perfectly secure quantum protocols by an arbitrarily large factor. More precisely, we prove that, in the quantum setting, string oblivious transfer can be reversed much more efficiently than by any classical protocol. 
For classical and perfect quantum protocols k ′ is essentially upper bounded by κ. In Theorem 5 we show that a weaker lower bound for quantum reductions holds also for quantum protocols in the statistical setting. Theorem 5 implies that quantum protocols cannot extend oblivious transfer, i.e., we show that there exists a constant c > 0 such that any quantum reduction of m + 1 instances of 
Finally, we also derive a lower bound on the number of commitments (Theorem 7) and on the total number of bits the players need to commit to (Theorem 6) in any ε-secure implementation of 
-OT
k , using commitments only, with an error of at most ε must use at least log(1/ε) − 6 commitments and needs to commit to at least k/2 − 12k
bits in total.
Corollary 3 implies that bit commitments cannot be extended. More precisely, there exists a constant c > 0 such that any protocol that implements m + 1 bit commitments out of m bit commitments must have an error of at least c m . Finally, in Section 8 we show that there exists a protocol that is essentially optimal with respect to Corollary 3. We use the protocol from [8, 22] , but let the receiver commit to blocks of measurements at once, to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8.
There exists a quantum protocol that implements 2 1 -OT k with an error of at most ε, using κ = O(log 1/ε) commitments to strings of size b, where κb = O(k + log 1/ε).
Notation
We use calligraphic letters to denote sets. We denote the distribution of a random variable X over X by P X . Given the distribution P XY over X × Y, the marginal distribution is denoted by P X (x) := y∈Y P XY (x, y). A conditional distribution P X|Y (x, y) over X ×Y defines for every y ∈ Y a distribution P X|Y =y . P X|Y can be seen as a randomized function that has input y and output x. The statistical distance between the distributions P X and P X ′ over the domain X is defined as the maximum, over all (inefficient) distinguishers D : X → {0, 1}, of the distinguishing advantage
If δ(P X , P X ′ ) ≤ ε, we may also say that P X is ε-close to P X ′ . The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is defined as 5
and the mutual information of X and Y as
5 All logarithms are binary, and we use the convention that 0 · log 0 = 0.
We use the notation
for the binary entropy function. We say that X, Y and Z form a Markov-chain, denoted by X ↔ Y ↔ Z, if X and Z are independent given Y , which means that P X|Y =y = P X|Y =y,Z=z for all y, z (,or P Z|Y =y = P Z|X=x,Y =y for all x, y, since the condition is symmetric in X and Z). Furthermore, we write [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}. If x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and T := {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊆ [n], then x| T denotes the substring (x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i k ) of x. If x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , then x ⊕ y denotes the bitwise XOR of x and y.
Primitives and Randomized Primitives
In the following we consider two-party primitives that take inputs x from Alice and y from Bob and outputsx to Alice andȳ to Bob, where (x,ȳ) are distributed according to PXȲ |XY . For simplicity, we identify such a primitive with PXȲ |XY . If the primitive has no input and outputs values (u, v) distributed according to P U V , we may simply write P U V . If the primitive is deterministic and only Bob gets an output, i.e., if there exists a function f : X ×Y → Z such that PXȲ |X=x,Y =y (⊥, f (x, y)) = 1 for all x, y, then we identify the primitive with the function f . Examples of such primitives are n t -OT k , (p)-RabinOT k , EQ n and IP n .
n t -OT k is the primitive where Alice has an input x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} k·n , and Bob has an input c ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} with |c| = t. Bob receives y = x| c ∈ {0, 1} tk .
-(p)-RabinOT k is the primitive where Alice has an input x ∈ {0, 1} k . Bob receives y which is equal to x with probability p and ∆ otherwise.
-The equality function EQ n : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is defined as EQ n (x, y) = 1, if x = y, 0, otherwise .
-The inner product modulo two function IP n : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is defined as
We often allow a protocol to use a primitive P U V that does not have any input. This is enough to model reductions to n t -OT k and (p)-RabinOT k , since these primitives are equivalent to distributed randomness P U V , i.e., there exist two protocols that are secure in the semi-honest model: one that generates the distributed randomness using one instance of the primitive, and one that implements one instance of the primitive using the distributed randomness as input to the two parties. The fact that 2 1 -OT 1 is equivalent to distributed randomness has been presented in [8, 5] . The generalization to n t -OT k is straightforward. The randomized primitives are obtained by simply choosing all inputs uniformly at random. For (p)-RabinOT k the implementation is straightforward. Hence, any protocol that uses some instances of n t -OT k or (p)-RabinOT k can be converted into a protocol that only uses a primitive P U V without any input.
Lower Bounds for Classical Two-Party Computation

Protocols and Security in the Semi-Honest Model
We will consider the semi-honest model, where both players behave honestly, but may save all the information they get during the protocol to obtain extra information about the other player's input or output. A protocol securely implements PXȲ |XY with an error of ε, if the entire view of each player can be simulatedwith an error of at most ε in an ideal setting, where the players only have black-box access to the primitive PXȲ |XY . Note that this simulation is not allowed to change neither the input nor the output. This definition of security follows Definition 7.2.1 from [32] , but is adapted to the case of computationally unbounded adversaries and statistical indistinguishability. Definition 1. Let π be a protocol with black-box access to a primitive P U V that implements a primitive PXȲ |XY . V iew π A (x, y) and V iew π B (x, y) denote the views of the Alice and Bob on input (x, y) defined as (x, u, m 1 , . . . , m i , r A ) and (x, v, m 1 , . . . , m i , r B ) respectively where r A and r B is the private randomness of the players, m i represents the i-th message and u, v is the output from P U V . Output π A (x, y) and Output π B (x, y) denote the outputs (that are implicit in the views) of Alice and Bob respectively on input (x, y). The protocol is secure in the semi-honest model with an error of at most ε, if there exist two randomized functions S A and S B , called the simulators 6 , such that for all x and y:
wherex,ȳ are distributed according to PXȲ |X=x,Y =y .
Sufficient Statistics
Intuitively speaking, the sufficient statistics 7 of X with respect to Y , denoted X ց Y , is the part of X that is correlated with Y . It is easy to show (see for example [30] ) that for any P XY , we have X ↔ X ց Y ↔ Y . This immediately implies that any protocol with access to a primitive P U V can be transformed into a protocol with access to P U ցV,V ցU (without compromising the security) because the players can compute P U V from P U ցV,V ցU privately. Thus, in the following we only consider primitives P U V where U = U ց V and V = V ց U .
Common Part
Roughly speaking, the common part X ∧ Y of X and Y is the maximal element of the set of all random variables (i.e., the finest random variable) that can be generated both from X and from Y without any error. For example, if X = (X 0 , X 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 and Y = (Y 0 , Y 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , and we have X 0 = Y 0 and Pr[X 1 = Y 1 ] = ε > 0, then the common part of X and Y is equivalent to X 0 . The common part was first introduced in [31] ; in a cryptographic context, it was used in [54].
Definition 3. Let X and Y be random variables with distribution P XY . Let X := supp(P X ) and Y := supp(P Y ). Then X ∧ Y , the common part of X and Y , is constructed in the following way:
-Consider the bipartite graph G with vertex set X ∪ Y, and where two vertices x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are connected by an edge if P XY (x, y) > 0 holds. -Let f X : X → 2 X ∪Y be the function that maps a vertex v ∈ X of G to the set of vertices in the connected component of G containing v. Let f Y : Y → 2 X ∪Y be the function that does the same for a vertex w ∈ Y of G. 6 We do not require the simulator to be efficient. 7 In [30] , sufficient statistics has been called the dependent part.
Lower Bounds for Secure Function Evaluation
Let a protocol be an ε-secure implementation of a primitive PXȲ |XY in the semi-honest model. Let P XY be the input distribution and let PXȲ be the corresponding output distribution of the ideal primitive, i.e., PXȲ := P XY PXȲ |XY , and let M be the whole communication during the execution of the protocol. Then the security of the protocol implies the following lemma that we will use in our proofs.
Proof. The security of the protocol implies that there exists a randomized function S B , such that
Using Lemma B1 and (B.6), we get
⊓ ⊔
We will now give lower bounds for ε-secure implementations of functions f : X × Y → Z from a primitive P U V in the semi-honest model. A function f has no redundant inputs for Alice if
Clearly, a function f can be computed from a primitive P U V with an error ε in the semi-honest model if and only if the function f ′ obtained by combining all redundant inputs for Alice can be computed with the same error. Let Alice's and Bob's inputs X and Y be independent and uniformly distributed and let M be the whole communication in the protocol. Loosely speaking, Alice must enter (almost) all the information about X into the protocol as follows: If Bob's input is y, then he must be able to compute f (X, y). But, as Alice must not learn y, she has to enter all information about f (X, y) into the protocol independent of Bob's input. Thus, Alice must input all information about f (X, y) into the protocol for all y. If f satisfies (2.1), then {f (x, y) : y ∈ Y} allows to compute x. Thus, Alice must enter all information about X into the protocol.
Lemma 2. For any protocol that is an ε-secure implementation of f in the semi-honest model,
Proof. There exists a randomized function S A such that δ(P XM U |Y =y , P XS A (X) ) ≤ ε for all y ∈ Y. Using the triangle inequality it follows that for any y, y ′
Together with (2.2) and Lemma B1 this implies that for any y, y ′
where the second inequality follows from (B.1). Since X can be calculated from the values f (X, y 1 ), . . . , f (X, y |Y| ), we get
The following theorem that gives a lower bound on the conditional entropy of P U V can then be obtained from Lemma 2.
Theorem 1. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function that satisfies (2.1). Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of f in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. Let y ∈ Y. From Lemma 2 and (B.3) follows that
Using (B.3), (B.2) and Lemma B1 , we get
and from Lemma 1, we get
The statement follows by maximizing over all y.
⊓ ⊔
Note that for some functions the bound of Theorem 1 can be improved by maximizing over all restrictions of the function f , i.e., over all functions f ′ (x, y) :
that still satisfy condition (2.1). Clearly, if f can be computed from a primitive P U V with an error ε in the semi-honest model, then f ′ can be computed with the same error. Thus, any lower bound for f ′ then implies a lower bound for f . The following corollaries follow immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 4. Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of n t -OT k in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. We can choose subsets C i ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈n/t⌉, of size t such that
. . , n}, and restrict Bob to choose his input among these sets. It is easy to check that condition (2.1) is satisfied. The statement follows from Theorem 1.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 5. Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of EQ n in the semihonest model. Then
Proof. We can restrict the input domains of both players to the same subsets of size 2 k . Condition (2.1) will still be satisfied. 8 Thus, the corollary follows immediately from Theorem 1.
There exists a secure reduction of EQ n to EQ k ( [6] ): Alice and Bob compare k inner products of their inputs with random strings using EQ k . This protocol is secure in the semi-honest model with an error 9 of at most 2 −κ . Since there exists a circuit to implement EQ k with k XOR gates and k AND gates, it follows from [33] that EQ k can be securely implemented using k instances to -OT 1 are equivalent to a primitive P U V with H(U |V ) = m, the bound of Corollary 5 is optimal up to a factor of 3. This implies that the term |Y| in the statement of the bound given in Theorem 1 cannot be reduced significantly, i.e., it is not possible to replace |Y| with log |Y| for example.
Corollary 6. Let a protocol having access to a primitive P U V be an ε-secure implementation of the inner product function IP n in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. Let e i ∈ {0, 1} n be the string that has a one at the i-th position and is zero otherwise. Let S := {e i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Then the protocol is an ε-secure implementation of the restriction IP S n of the inner-product function to {0, 1} n × S. Since IP S n satisfies condition (2.1), the statement follows from Theorem 1.
If ε + h(ε) ≤ 1/8, then it immediately follows from Corollary 6 that we need at least n/2 − 1 calls to 2 1 -OT 1 to compute IP n with an error of at most ε. From the protocol presented in [6] we know that there exists a perfectly secure protocol that computes IP n from n instances of 2 1 -OT 1 . Therefore, the bound is optimal up to a factor of 2 (see Appendix B.2).
For our next lower-bound, the function f : X × Y → Z must satisfy the following property. There exist y 1 ∈ Y such that
and y 2 ∈ Y such that
Let Alice's input X be uniformly distributed. Loosely speaking, the security of the protocol implies that the communication gives (almost) no information about Alice's input X if Bob's input is y 2 . But the communication must be (almost) independent of Bob's input, otherwise Alice could learn Bob's input. Thus, Alice's input X is uniform with respect to the whole communication even when Bob's input is y 1 . Let now Bob's input be fixed to y 1 and let M be the whole communication. Then the following lower bound can be proved using the given intuition.
Proof. Let g U , g V be the functions that compute the common part of P U V . As in the proof of Lemma 2 we get for all
which implies that
Because the protocol is secure, there exists a simulator S B such that
Therefore, using the triangle inequality we get that
Using the triangle inequality again it follows from (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9) that
Using Lemma B1 we get
The following lower bound on the mutual information of P U V can then be obtained from Lemma 3.
Theorem 2. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function that satisfies (2.4) and (2.5). Then for any protocol that implements f from a primitive P U V with an error of at most ε in the semi-honest model
Proof. Let Alice's input X be uniformly distributed and Bob's input be fixed to y 1 . Let Z be Bob's output and M the whole communication. Then Lemma 3 implies that
Since Pr[Z = f (X, y 1 )] ≤ ε and X ↔ V M ↔ Z, it follows from (B.6) and (B.9) that
(2.10) and (2.11) imply, using X ↔ U M ↔ ZY V , (B.8) and (B.4), that
, the sequence of all messages sent until the ith round. Without loss of generality, let us assume that Alice sends the message of the (i + 1)th round. Since, we have
Then it follows by induction over all rounds that
The statement follows.
Since properties (2.4) and (2.5) can be satisfied by restricting Alice's input in n t -OT k , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of n t -OT k in the semi-honest model where t ≤ ⌊n/2⌋. Then
Proof. Consider the function that is obtained by setting the first n − t inputs to a fixed value (and choosing the remaining t inputs from {0, 1} tk ).
We further generalize Theorem 2 to arbitrary functions f : X × Y → Z in Section B.3 in the appendix. In the case of perfect implementations the bound H(U ) = H(U |V ) + I(U ; V ) ≥ log |X | follows from Theorem 1 and the generalization of Theorem 2. From this bound we get that any perfectly secure protocol needs at least log |X | instances of Lemma 4. Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of m independent copies of n 1 -OT 1 in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. Let Alice and Bob choose their inputs X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) = ((X 1 0 , . . . , X 1 n−1 ), . . . , (X m 0 , . . . , X m n−1 )) ∈ {0, 1} mn and C = (C 1 , . . . , C m ) ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} m uniformly at random. Let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) be the output of Bob at the end of the protocol. Let us for the moment look that the jth instance of
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. From the security of the protocol follows that there exist a randomized function S B (c, x c ) such that for all a = (a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n−1 ,
Hence, using the triangle inequality, we get for all a, a ′ that
Now, let us map C j to a bit-string of size ⌈log n⌉, and let C b be the bth bit of that bit string, where
, where a b i = 1 if and only if the bth bit of i is 1.
From (2.12) and (2.14), we get
It follows from (2.12) and (2.15) that for all b
3) and ⌈log n⌉ ≤ log n + 1 follows that
and, therefore,
Using (B.3), (B.2) and Lemmas B1 and 1, we get
≤ H(V | U ) + 3m(log n + 2)(ε + h(ε)) .
Together with the bounds from Theorem 1 and 2 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of m instances of
Since m instances of
with an error of at most ε needs to fulfill
Hence, we get
which is the statement of Corollary 1. In Appendix B we also derive new bounds for protocols implementing (p)-RabinOT k (Theorems B1-B2), and show that our bounds imply bounds for implementations of oblivious linear function evaluation (OLFE, Corollary B1). In Appendix A we show that our bounds on OT and RabinOT in the semi-honest model imply similar bounds in the malicious model.
Quantum Reductions
Reversing String OT Efficiently
As the bounds of the last section generalize the known bounds for perfect implementations of OT from [4, 26, 56, 55 ] to the statistical case, it is natural to ask whether similar bounds also hold for quantum protocols, i.e., if the bounds presented in [48] can be generalized to the statistical case. We give a negative answer to this question by presenting a statistically secure quantum protocol that violates these bounds. Thereto we introduce the following functionality F A→B,k MCOM that can be implemented from [8, 61, 22] . In the protocol, Alice sends m BB84-states to Bob who measures them either in the computational or in the diagonal basis. To ensure that he really measures Bob has to commit to the basis he has measured in and the measurement outcome for every qubit received. Alice then asks Bob to open a small subset T of size αm of these pairs of commitments. OT can then be implemented using further classical processing. (See [22] 
1. Alice and Bob invoke F A→B,k OT with random inputs
Open(T):
1. Alice sends b| T , T and Since any protocol that is also statistically secure in the classical universal composability model [14] is also secure in the quantum universal composability model [51], we get, together with the proofs from [22, 51] , the following theorem. 
Since we can choose k ≫ κ, this immediately implies that the bound of Corollary 4 does not hold for quantum protocols. Similar violations can be shown for the other two lower bounds given in Theorem 7. For example, statistically secure and universally composable 10 commitments can be implemented from shared randomness P U V that is distributed according to (p)-RabinOT at a rate of
with k ∈ Ω(n(1 − p)) from n copies of P U V . Since I(U ; V ) = p, quantum protocols can also violate the bound of Corollary 7.
It has been an open question whether noiseless quantum communication can increase the commitment capacity [53] . Our example implies a positive answer to this question.
Lower Bounds
The protocols presented in the previous section prove that the known impossibility results for perfectly secure oblivious transfer reductions from [48] do not hold for statistically secure quantum protocols. Thus, it is natural to ask whether quantum protocols can even extend oblivious transfer or, more generally, how efficient statistically secure quantum protocols can be. In this section we prove an impossibility result that holds for statistically secure quantum protocols and that implies in particular that also quantum protocols cannot extend OT. Since, in contrast to the classical case, security against semi-honest adversaries can be trivially achieved in the quantum setting, we consider in the following protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries in the stand-alone model.
Preliminaries
We use the notation ρ AB for a state over the Hilbert space H A ⊗ H B , and ρ A := tr B (ρ AB ). Let d A be the dimension of H A (We assume that all Hilbert spaces are finite-dimensional. 
The statistical distance between two states ρ and φ is defined as
where we maximize over all measurements D(·) that take a quantum state as input and output one bit. We need the von Neumann entropy, defined as
where H(ρ) := tr(−ρ log(ρ)), and the following facts about the von Neumann entropy. First, from the Alicki-Fannes inequality [2] follows that for any state
If there exists a measurement on B with outcome X ′ such that Pr[X ′ = X] ≤ ε, then
for any cq-state ρ XB . Finally, we use the fact that joint entropy of two systems satisfies subadditivity and the triangle inequality
3)
This implies
for any state ρ ABC .
Oblivious Transfer
A protocol is an ε-secure implementation of OT if for any adversary A attacking the protocol (real setting), there exists a simulator S using the ideal OT (ideal setting) such that for all inputs of the honest players the real and the ideal setting can be distinguished with an advantage of at most ε. This definition implies the following three conditions (see also [29] ).
-Correctness: If both players are honest, then in the ideal setting, the receiver always gets y = x c . This implies that in an ε-secure protocol, Bob must output a value Y where
-Security for Alice: Let now Alice be honest and Bob malicious, and let Alice's input be chosen uniformly at random. In the ideal setting, the simulator must provide OT with a classical input C ′ ∈ {0, 1}. He gets back the output Y and then outputs a quantum state that may depend on C ′ and Y . The output of the simulator together with classical values X 0 , X 1 and C ′ now define the state σ X 0 X 1 BC ′ . Since X 1−C ′ is random and independent of C ′ and Y , we must have
where ρ X 0 X 1 B is the resulting state of the protocol. 11 -Security for Bob: If Bob is honest and Alice malicious, the simulator outputs a quantum state σ A that is independent of Bob's input c. Let ρ A c be the state that Alice has at the end of the protocol if Bob's input is c. The security definition now requires that δ(σ A , ρ A c ) ≤ ε for c ∈ {0, 1}. By the triangle inequality, we get δ(ρ
Note that the Conditions (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) are only necessary for the security of a protocol, they do not imply that a protocol is secure.
In the following we will give two lower bounds for quantum protocols that implement . First, the protocol is replaced by a purified version of the protocol that is equivalent in a certain sense. In particular the purified version has the same security properties as the original protocol and the impossibility 11 The standard security definition of OT considered here requires Bob's choice bit to be fixed at the end of the protocol. To show that a protocol is insecure, it suffices therefore to show that Bob can still choose after the termination of the protocol if he wants to receive x0 or x1. 
We first consider protocols where the players have access to a primitive that generates a pure state |ψ ABE , distributes registers A and B to Alice and Bob respectively and keeps the purification in its register E. Let Alice choose her inputs X 0 and X 1 uniformly at random and let Bob's input be c. When Alice and Bob execute the purified protocol honestly the final state just before the honest players perform their measurements is a pure state |ρ ABE c
, where A and B are the registers of Alice and Bob and E is the register of the trusted resource.
Theorem 5. To implement one instance of 2 1 -OT k over strings of size k with an error of at most ε from a primitive |ψ ABE with a quantum protocol we need
Proof. Let the final state of the protocol be |ρ
, when both players are honest and Bob has input c ∈ {0, 1}. If Bob is executing the protocol honestly using input c = 1, he must be able to calculate X 1 with an error of at most 1 − ε. Since the protocol is ε-secure for Alice, it follows from Lemma 11 in Appendix F that δ(ρ
Since the protocol is ε-secure for Bob, we have δ(ρ A 0 , ρ A 1 ) ≤ 2ε. From Lemma 6 follows that there exists a unitary U BE such that Bob could transform the state ρ 1 into the state ρ ′ 0 with δ(ρ 0 , ρ ′ 0 ) ≤ 2 √ ε, if he had access to E. Since in ρ
, X 0 can be guessed from ρ B 0 with probability 1 − ε, it follows from Lemma 10 in Appendix F that X 0 can be guessed from ρ BE 1 with a probability of at least 1 − ε − 2 √ ε.
Using Eq. (3.2), we get
Hence, using (3.5) the statement follows
⊓ ⊔
A classical primitive P U V can be modeled by the quantum primitive
that distributes the values u and v and keeps the purification in its register E. Therefore, we get the following corollary from Theorem 5.
Corollary 8.
To implement one instance of 2 1 -OT k with an error of at most ε from P U V with a quantum protocol, we need
Since m instances of 2 1 -OT k can be implemented from shared randomness with H(U V ) = 2k + 1 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 9. To implement one instance of 2 1 -OT k with an error of at most ε from n instances of 2 1 -OT k ′ in either direction with a quantum protocol, we need
Next, we present a bound for implementations of 2 1 -OT k from commitments. We can model blackbox commitments by a trusted functionality that receives bits over a classical channel and stores them in a register E. When the committer sends the open command, the functionality sends the bits to the receiver. We can replace the two classical channels with a quantum channel where the players measure the qubits when sending and after receiving them. These measurements can then be purified by the players. The following bound can then be obtained by adapting the proof of Theorem 5 to this scenario.
Theorem 6. To implement a 2 1 -OT
k with an error of at most ε we need to commit to at least
Proof. Let the final state of the protocol be |ρ ABE c
, when both players are honest and Bob has input c ∈ {0, 1}. As in the proof of Theorem 5 we get that
Let E contain at most n qubits. Then it follows from Eq. (3.5) that
Hence, the statement follows from
⊓ ⊔
From Corollary 9 and Theorem 6 follows that OTs and commitments cannot be extended by quantum protocols. Next, we give an additional lower bound for reductions of OT to commitments that shows that the number of commitments (of arbitrary size) used in any ε-secure protocol must be at least Ω(log(1/ε)). We model the commitments as before, but store the commitments of Alice and Bob separately in E A and E B . The proof idea is the following: We let the adversary guess a subset T of commitments that he will be required to open during the protocol. He honestly executes all commitments in T , but cheats in all others. If the adversary guesses T right, he is able to cheat in the same way as in any protocol that does not use any commitments. Proof. We assume that both Alice and Bob commit at most κ times. We will show that there exists a malicious Alice and a malicious Bob such that either Alice can break Bob's security condition or vice versa.
Theorem 7. Any quantum protocol that implements
Let |ρ
be the final state of the protocol when both players are honest and Bob has input c ∈ {0, 1}. We distinguish two cases. In the first case we assume that an honest Alice could guess c with an advantage of at least ε ′ := 1/18, if she had access to AE A , i.e., δ(ρ
We let Bob be honest and let Alice apply the following strategy: She chooses a random subset T of [k] . She executes all commitments in T honestly, but for all commitments not in T she sends |0 to E A and keeps her state in her quantum register. Otherwise, she follows the whole protocol honestly. During the protocol, Bob may ask Alice to open certain commitments. Let T ′ be the set of commitments that Alice has to open. If T ′ = T , which happens with probability 2 −κ independent of everything else, then at the end of the protocol the global state is |ρ c , with the difference that the values normally in E A are now part of A. Therefore, Alice has an advantage of more than ε ′ to distinguish c = 0 from c = 1 in this case, and her total advantage is more than ε ′ · 2 −κ > 2ε, which contradicts condition (3.8).
In the second case, we assume that δ(ρ
) < ε ′ . From condition (3.6) follows that honest Bob can guess X 1 with probability 1 − ε if c = 1. We can apply Lemma 11, which tells us that X 1 should be 5ε-close to uniform with respect to ρ B 1 . To get a contradiction to the security condition (3.7), we can use equation (F.1) (which is implied by Lemma 10 in Appendix F): it suffices to show that Bob can guess the first bit of X 0 with a probability of at least 1 2 + 5ε. Let Alice be honest and Bob do the same attack as Alice in the first case, choosing c = 1. Again, if Bob guesses the set T right, which happens with probability 2 −κ , all qubits normally in E B are in B. Then Lemma 6 tells us that there exist a unitary U BC B such Bob can transform the state ρ 1 into a state ρ ′ 1 where δ(ρ 0 , ρ ′ 1 ) ≤ √ 2ε ′ . Bob can guess X 0 with an error of at most ε in ρ 0 . Therefore, he can guess X 0 in ρ ′ 1 with an error of at most √ 2ε ′ + ε. If he fails to guess T , he simply outputs a random bit as guess for the first bit of X 0 . Since the probability that he guesses T correctly is exactly 2 −κ , he can guess the first bit of X 0 with probability
Reduction of OT to String-Commitments
The protocol we described in Section 3.1 uses m = O(k + κ) commitments to 2 bits to implement 2 1 -OT k with an error of 2 −Ω(κ) . If k = ω(κ) this it is not optimal with respect to Theorem 7. We will now show how to construct a protocol that is optimal with respect to the lower bounds of both Theorem 6 and Theorem 7. We modify the protocol by grouping the m pairs into κ blocks of size b := m/κ. We let Bob commit to the blocks of b pairs of values at once. The subset T is now of size ακ, and defines the blocks to be opened by Bob. If Bob is able to open all commitments in T correctly, then with high probability, he must have correctly measured almost all qubits. We only need to estimate the error probability of the sampling strategy that corresponds to the new checking procedure which Alice applies and apply the proof of [22] to get the following theorem. 
Conclusions
The main contribution of this work are impossibility proofs for statistical oblivious transfer reductions. In the classical case we have generalized several known lower bounds for perfect reductions to statistical security. In the quantum case we have shown that the known bound for perfect reductions does not apply to statistical reductions, and have presented a new bound that does hold in the statistical quantum setting. Our bounds imply several important impossibility results, for example, that OT cannot be extended, neither in the classical nor in the quantum setting.
There are many interesting open questions. For example, it is not known whether more than two instances of A Malicious OT implies Semi-honest OT In the malicious model the adversary is not required to follow the protocol. Therefore, a protocol that is secure in the malicious model protects against a much bigger set of adversaries. On the other hand, the security definition in the malicious model only implies that for any (also semi-honest) adversary there exists a malicious simulator for the ideal primitive, i.e., the simulator is allowed to change his input or output from the ideal primitive. Since this is not allowed in the semi-honest model, security in the malicious model does not imply security in the semi-honest model in general. For implementations of OT 12 , however, it has been shown in [46] that this implication does hold, because if the adversary is semi-honest, a simulator can only change the input with small probability. Otherwise, he is not able to correctly simulate the input or the output of the protocol. Therefore, any impossibility result for OT in the semi-honest model also implies impossibility in the malicious model.
We will state these results for n 1 -OT k and (p)-RabinOT k with explicit bounds on the errors.
Lemma A1 If a protocol implementing n 1 -OT k is secure in the malicious model with an error of at most ε, then it is also secure in the semi-honest model with an error of at most (2n + 1)ε.
Proof. From the security of the protocol we know that there exists a (malicious) simulator that simulates the view of honest Alice. If two honest players execute the protocol on input (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) and c, then with probability 1 − ε the receiver gets y = x c . Thus, the simulator can change the input x i with probability at most 2ε for all 0 ≤ i < n − 1. We construct a new simulator that executes the malicious simulator but never changes the input. This simulation is (2n + 1)ε-close to the distribution of the protocol. From the security of the protocol we also know that there exists a (malicious) simulator that simulates the view of honest Bob. If two honest players execute the protocol with uniform input (X 0 , . . . , X n−1 ) and choice bit c, then with probability 1 − ε the receiver gets y = x c . If the simulator changes the choice bit c, he does not learn x c and the simulated y is not equal to x c with probability at least 1/2. Therefore, the simulator can change c or the output with probability at most 4ε. As above we can construct a simulator for the semi-honest model with an error of at most 5ε.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma A2 If a protocol implementing (p)-RabinOT k is secure in the malicious model with an error of at most ε, then it is also secure in the semi-honest model with an error of at most max(
Proof. From the security of the protocol we know that there exists a (malicious) simulator that simulates the view of honest Alice. If two honest players execute the protocol on input x, then with probability at most ε the receiver gets an output x ′ / ∈ {x, ∆}. Thus, the simulator can change the input x with probability at most 2ε/p. From the security of the protocol we also know that there exists a (malicious) simulator that simulates the view of honest Bob. Let the input be chosen uniformly. If the simulator changes the output from ∆ to y ′ , then with probability at most 1/2 k it holds that y ′ = x. Thus, the simulator may change the output with probability at most
Therefore the simulator may change an output x = ∆ with probability at most
Otherwise the probability that x ′ / ∈ {x, ∆} is greater than 2ε. As in lemma A1 we can now construct semi-honest simulators with an error of at most max(
Note that some of our proofs could easily be adapted to the malicious model to get slightly better bounds than the ones that follow from the combination of the bounds in the semi-honest model and Lemmas A1 and A2.
B Lower Bounds for Classical Two-Party Computation
B.1 Information Theory
We will use the following tools from information theory 13 in our proofs. The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is defined as 14
and the mutual information of X and Y given Z as
for the binary entropy function, i.e., h(p) is the Shannon entropy of a binary random variable that takes on one value with probability p and the other with 1 − p. Note that the function h(p) is concave, which implies that for any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, we have
We will need the chain-rule
and the following monotonicity inequalities
We will also need
It is easy to show that if W ↔ XZ ↔ Y , then
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma B1 Let (X, Y ), and (X,Ŷ ) be random variables distributed according to P XY and PXŶ , and let δ(P XY , PXŶ ) ≤ ǫ. Then
13 See [16] for a good introduction into information theory. 14 All logarithms are binary, and we use the convention that 0 · log 0 = 0.
Proof. There exist random variables A, B such that P XY |A=0 = PXŶ |B=0 and Pr[A = 0] = Pr[B = 0] = 1 − ǫ. Thus, using the monotonicity of the entropy and the fact that H(X) ≤ log(|X |) we get that
⊓ ⊔ Lemma (B1) implies Fano's inequality: For all X,X ∈ X with Pr[X =X] ≤ ε, we have
B.2 Inner Product from OT Proposition 1. There is a protocol that computes the function IP n in the semi-honest model perfectly secure with n calls to
Proof. Consider the following protocol from [6] that is adapted to 
, the protocol is correct. The security for Alice follows from the fact that z 1 , . . . , z n is a uniformly random string subject to ⊕ n i=1 z i = IP n (x, y).
B.3 Generalization of Theorem 2
Let f : X × Y → Z be a function. Then we represent f by a |X | × |Y|-matrix M f with M f (x, y) = f (x, y). In order to generalize Theorem 2 we define the following relation on the rows of a matrix M f .
Definition 5 ([39]
). The relation ∼ on the rows of a matrix M f is defined as follows:
The equivalence relation ≡ r on the rows of M f is defined as the transitive closure of ∼, i.e., x, x ′ ∈ X satisfy x ≡ r x ′ if there exist
Furthermore, we say that x, x ′ ∈ X are c-equivalent with respect to ≡ r with c ∈ N, if there exist x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that x ∼ x 1 ∼ · · · ∼ x ℓ ∼ x ′ and ℓ ≤ c.
Lemma 7. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function such that all rows of M f are c-equivalent with respect to ≡ r . Let X and Y be chosen uniformly at random. Then for all x, x ′ ∈ X and all y ∈ Y δ(P M |X=x,Y =y , P M |X=x ′ ,Y =y ) ≤ 2(1 + 2(c + 1))ε = (6 + 4c)ε.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2 we get for all y = y ′ ∈ Y that
From the security of the protocol there exists a simulator S B such that for all x, y δ(P M |X=x,Y =y , P S B (y,f (x,y)) ) ≤ ε.
Thus, for all x, x ′ , y with f (x, y) = f (x ′ , y), we have
Since all all rows of M f are c-equivalent with respect to ≡ r , we get δ(P M |X=x,Y =y , P M |X=x ′ ,Y =y ) ≤ 2(1 + 2(c + 1))ε = (6 + 4c)ε.
⊓ ⊔
Let f : X × Y → Z be a function such that there existsȳ ∈ Y with |{f (x,ȳ) : x ∈ X }| ≥ t and all rows of M f are c-equivalent with respect to ≡ r . There exists X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′ | = t and f (x,ȳ) = f (x ′ ,ȳ) for all x = x ′ ∈ X ′ . Let Alice's input X be uniformly distributed over X ′ . Let Bob's input be fixed toȳ. Let M be the whole communication. Then the following lemma holds for any ε-secure implementation of f .
Proof. From Lemma 7, we have
This implies that δ(P XM , P X P M ) ≤ (6 + 4c)ε.
≥ log(t) − (6 + 4c)ε log(t) − (6 + 4c)h(ε).
The following theorem follows from Lemma 8 using the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 9. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function such that all rows of M f are c-equivalent with respect to ≡ r and such that there existsȳ ∈ Y with |{f (x,ȳ) : x ∈ X }| ≥ t. Then for any protocol that implements f with an error of at most ε in the semi-honest model from a primitive P U V I(U ; V ) ≥ log(t) − (7 + 4c)ε log(t) − (7 + 4c)h(ε).
B.4 Lower Bounds for Protocols implementing RabinOT
Let a protocol P having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of (p)-RabinOT k in the semihonest model. In the following we assume 0 ≤ ε < min(p, 1 − p). Let X ∈ {0, 1} k be the uniformly distributed input of Alice and Y ∈ {0, 1} k ∪ ∆ the output of Bob. Let M be the whole communication during the execution of the protocol. Let PȲ |X be the conditional distribution of an ideal RabinOT and PȲ X := P X PȲ |X . Then the following two lemmas hold for any protocol.
Lemma B2
Proof. From the security of the protocol follows that there exists a simulator S A (x) such that δ(P XS A (X)Ȳ , P XU M Y ) ≤ ε. Let D = 1 if Y = ∆ and 0 otherwise, andD = 1 ifȲ = ∆ and 0 otherwise. We have P XS A (X)D = P XS A (X) PD. From Lemma F2 follows that
We have X ↔ U M ↔ Y . Thus, it follows from (B.6) and (B.9) that
Together (B.10) and (B.11) imply that 12) and (B.5), (B.11) and (B.12) imply that
Proof. There exists a simulator S B (ȳ) such that δ(
follows from (B.6) and Lemma B1 that
⊓ ⊔
Theorem B1 Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of (p)-RabinOT k in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. From Lemma B2 and (B.3)
Using Lemmas B1 and 1, (B.3) and (B.2) we get
The statement follows now from 1/(min(p, 1
Proof. Let D be defined as before. Since the protocol is secure, there exists a simulator
. LetD = 1 ifȲ = ∆ and 0 otherwise. We have P XM AD = P XM A PD. We have
Together with Lemma F2 it follows that
Since H(X | M B ,Ȳ = ∆) = k, together with Lemma B1 this implies
.
From (B.5) follows
Therefore, using Lemma B1 again,
The statement follows now from 1/(min(p, 1 − p) − 2ε) ≥ 1. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem B2 Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of (p)-RabinOT k in the semi-honest model. Then
Proof. Let Alice input X be uniformly distributed. Let Y be Bob's outputs and M be the whole communication. Then Lemma B4 implies that
and from Lemma B3 we have
Together this implies
The statement follows now from 1/(min(p, 1 − p) − 2ε) ≥ 1.
⊓ ⊔
Note that as in the case of n 1 -OT k , the statement of these theorems can be generalized to m independent instances. We leave this to the full version [severin: ?] of this work.
B.5 Lower Bounds for Protocols implementing OLFE
We will now show that Theorem 3 also implies bounds for oblivious linear function evaluation ((q)-OLFE), which is defined as follows:
-For any finite field GF (q) of size q, (q)-OLFE is the primitive where Alice has an input a, b ∈ GF (q) and Bob has an input c ∈ GF (q).
Our lower bound is a simple consequence of the fact that (q)-OLFE can be used to implement
Corollary B1 Let a protocol having access to P U V be an ε-secure implementation of m instances of (q)-OLFE in the semi-honest model. Then
I(U ; V ) ≥ m log q − 7(εm log q + h(ε)) . 
It is easy to see that the protocol is also secure. Therefore, a violation of (B.13) or (B.15) would imply a violation of Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. Furthermore, it has been shown in [57] that (q)-OLFE is symmetric. Hence, a violation of (B.14) would imply a violation of (B.13).
⊓ ⊔
From Corollary B1 follows immediately that
Corollary B2 Let a protocol P having access to m instances of (q)-OLFE be an ε-secure implementation of m + 1 instances of (q)-OLFE in the semi-honest model. Then
C Quantum Reductions
Lemma 5. The protocol of Section 3.1 statistically UC-realizes F
A→B,k MCOM
with an error of 2 −κ/2 using κ instances of F A→B,k OT .
Proof. Note that we assume that all communication between the players is over secure channels and we only consider static adversaries. The statement is obviously true in the case of no corrupted parties and in the case of both the sender and the recipient being corrupted. We construct for any adversary A a simulator S that runs a copy of A as a black-box: In the case where the sender is corrupted, the simulator S can extract the commitment b from the input to F A→B,k OT and the messages except with probability 2 −κ/2 as follows: Define the extracted commitment as
where maj denotes the majority function. Let T be a (non-empty) subset of [k] and letb ∈ {0, 1} k such thatb| T = b| T . Then an honest recipient acceptsb| T together with T in Open with probability at most 2 −κ/2 as follows: There must exist j ∈ T such that b j =b j . Then the sender needs to change either x i 0,j or x i 1,j for at least κ/2 indices i. Thus, the simulator extracts the bit b in the commit phase as specified before and gives (commit, b) to F A→B,k MCOM . Upon getting (b, T ) from the adversary, the simulator gives (open, T ) to F A→B,k MCOM , ifb| T = b| T , otherwise it stops. Therefore, any environment can distinguish the simulation and the real execution with an advantage of at most 2 −κ/2 . In the case where the recipient is corrupted, the simulator S, upon getting the message committed from The fidelity between ρ and φ is defined as F (ρ, σ) := tr φρ φ . .
⊓ ⊔
D.4 Proof of Theorem 8
We now give a formal statement for the only part that needs to be modified in the security proof of [22] , which is the last part of the proof of Lemma 4.3. We need the following sampling lemma. Therefore, ρ T estAE andρ T estAE are still 2 −Ω(κ) -close to each other. Everything else in the proof in [22] remains the same. Therefore, we get Theorem 8. There exists a quantum protocol that implements 
D.5 Proof of Corollary 12
Using the sampling strategy of Lemma 9 and the proof of Theorem 4 from [9] we get the following corollary.
Corollary 13. Consider an execution of the above described implementation of 2 1 -OT k from string commitments. Let X 0 and X 1 be the strings from {0, 1} k output by Alice. Then there exists a bit c such that X 1−c is close to uniform with respect to Bob's view (given X c ), i.e., for any ε, δ > 0: where E denotes the quantum state output by Bob and ½ the identity operator on C 2 k .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4 from [9] we consider the equivalent EPR-version of the protocol. Let
be the state shared between Alice and Bob after Bob has committed to the basesθ and the measurement outcomesx where we can assumeθ =x = (0, . . . , 0). Alice now chooses a subset T of size ακb to be opened by Bob. Let α ′ := (1/2 − δ/2)α. Using Lemma 9 we can conclude that the state |ϕ AT Eo is ε δ quant ≤ ε δ class ≤ 3 exp(−α ′ κδ 2 /8)
close to being a superposition of states with Hamming weight of at most δ within AT (if Alice does not abort). The statement then follows from the proof given in [9] . Proof. Let a j be the number bits where y is equal to 1 in the jth block, for j ∈ [κ], and letT * be the complement of T * . We apply Lemma E2 choosing β j := 1 − a j /b and get Lemma 10 shows that if two cq-states are close, then the probability to guess the classical bit from the quantum part are close as well.
F.3 Lemma F1
Lemma F1 Let P XY be a distribution over X × {0, 1}. Then for any P X ′ over X , we have δ(P X|Y =0 , P X|Y =1 ) ≤ δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ) min(P Y (0), P Y (1))
Proof. For y ∈ {0, 1}, we have δ(P X|Y =y , P X ′ ) = 1 2 x P XY (x, y) P Y (y)
|P XY (x, y) − P X ′ (x)P Y (y)| .
Hence, δ(P X|Y =0 , P X|Y =1 ) ≤ δ(P X|Y =0 , P X ′ ) + δ(P X|Y =1 , P X ′ )
δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ) .
⊓ ⊔
F.4 Lemma F2
Lemma F2 Let P XY be a distribution over X × {0, 1}, P X ′ over X and P Y ′ over {0, 1}. Then δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ′ ) ≤ ε implies δ(P X|Y =0 , P X|Y =1 ) ≤ 2ε min(P Y ′ (0), P Y ′ (1)) − ε .
Proof (Proof of Lemma F2). δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ′ ) ≤ ε implies δ(P X , P X ′ ) ≤ ε and hence δ(P X P Y ′ , P X ′ P Y ′ ) = δ(P X , P X ′ ) ≤ ε .
We get δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ) ≤ δ(P X P Y , P X ′ P Y ′ ) + δ(P X ′ P Y ′ , P X ′ P Y ) ≤ 2ε .
δ(P XY , P X ′ P Y ′ ) ≤ ε also implies δ(P Y , P Y ′ ) ≤ ε, from which follows that for y ∈ {0, 1}, |P Y (y) − P Y ′ (y)| ≤ ε. We get 1 min(P Y (0), P Y (1)) ≤ 1 min(P Y ′ (0), P Y ′ (1)) − ε The statement follows now by applying Lemma F1. ⊓ ⊔
